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[The High Court of Australia’s decision in Electrolux No 3, combined with 
the Australian government’s changes to workplace relations law, has en-
sured that unions are prohibited from charging bargaining fees.  The gov-
ernment claimed to have prohibited the fees on the basis that they offend 
the principle of “freedom of association”. However, the government failed 
to consider other policy considerations and considerable international 
precedents that suggest if bargaining fees are limited to an amount cover-
ing bargaining services alone, they provide unions with a beneficial source 
of financial security, whilst also overcoming the free-rider problem and 
maintaining respect for the concept of voluntary unionism.  Therefore, it is 
perhaps incorrect to suggest that the prohibition of bargaining fees was 
prescribed by the government on the basis of some overriding concern for 
the freedom of association.  Rather it seems more realistic to suggest that 
freedom of association was the guise under which the government was 
able to further marginalise the role of unions in industrial relations in or-
der to promote its own ideological and economic agenda.] 
 
 
 
 
* Law Graduate. This article was initially prepared as an LLB Honours Thesis in 2004, which was 
revised and updated for publication in the DEAKIN LAW REVIEW.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
Trade unions have long held a central role in the Australian industrial relations 
system as the guardians of worker’s rights; in order to maintain this position they 
have constantly looked to protect their organisational security.  However, in more 
recent times legislative amendments have seen the pivotal role of unions stripped 
away and traditional union security arrangements invalidated.  In an attempt to 
ensure their viability within this changing industrial environment, and more specifi-
cally to address the ‘free-rider’ problem, unions sought to enforce a new form of 
security whereby a non-union employee who obtained the benefit of a union negoti-
ated agreement would pay a fee to the union for the provision of bargaining ser-
vices. 
 
The enforcement of these ‘bargaining agent’s fees’ drew strong reaction from 
employers and industry groups.  After extensive litigation the High Court eventu-
ally found that provisions purporting to implement bargaining fees could not be 
included in federally certified enterprise agreements.  In reaching its decision the 
High Court took a legalistic approach to its interpretation of the Workplace Rela-
tions Act 1996 (Cth) (‘WR Act’) without giving significant consideration to the 
practicalities of industrial relations under Australia’s enterprise bargaining regime.  
This ensured that the task of unions in representing their members was made more 
demanding by virtue of the legal and financial constraints that the decision placed 
upon their operations. 
 
Regardless of the High Court’s apparent oversight, the federal government had pre-
empted this decision through the passing of the Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Act 2003 (Cth) (‘WRAPCUF Act’).  The 
government's legislation prohibited ‘bargaining services fee’ clauses from being 
included in certified agreements and deemed such clauses to be contrary to the 
principle of freedom of association.  In doing so the legislation appears to have 
ignored competing public policy considerations, and also the fact that if bargaining 
fees are limited to a fair fee designed to reflect bargaining expenditure alone, they 
are an effective means of dealing with the free-rider problem without depriving 
individuals of freedom of choice over union membership.  
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II ENTERPRISE BARGAINING & THE ROLE OF UNIONS 
The primary focus of the Australian industrial relations system has now unequivo-
cally shifted to the regulation of employment relationships by direct negotiation at 
the level of workplace or enterprise.1  The rhetoric at the time of moving away from 
the award system to enterprise bargaining was that it would allow workers and their 
employers to customise their agreements in order to suit their specific circum-
stances.2  However, it has also resulted in stretching trade union resources and 
reducing their influence in the industrial system. 
 
Enterprise bargaining is the name given to the process of negotiation between an 
employer and employees (or their representatives) in order to reach an agreement 
regulating the terms and conditions of employment within a particular workplace.  
In the federal jurisdiction, the provisions regulating collective agreements made at 
enterprise level are contained in Part VIB of the WR Act.  Division 2 of Part VIB 
provides that an employer who is a constitutional corporation3 may enter into an 
enterprise agreement with one or more trade unions4 or directly with its employ-
ees.5  For a union to be a party to an agreement under Division 2, it is required that 
they have ‘at least one member employed in the single business or part of it that is 
to be covered by the agreement’, and that they be ‘entitled to represent the indus-
trial interests of that member in relation to the work that will be covered by the 
agreement.’6   
 
The involvement of unions in the agreement making process recognises the impor-
tance of the collective strength of employees in redressing the inequality of bargain-
ing power between an individual employee and his or her employer.7  However, the 
decentralisation of the Australian industrial relations regime has seen unions strug-
gle to maintain their viability.   The enterprise bargaining system has strained union 
resources by increasing the necessity to establish a collective agreement in each 
individual workplace.  Moreover, unions are no longer considered an essential part 
of the industrial system; their powers have been extensively curtailed8 and workers 
are given broad freedoms to negotiate enterprise agreements without trade union 
involvement.9   
 
1 BREEN CREIGHTON AND ANDREW STEWART, LABOUR LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (3rd ed, 2000) [6.65]. 
2 See generally, Commonwealth, Second Reading Speech to the Workplace Relations and Other Legisla-
tion Amendment Bill 1996, House of Representatives, 23 May 1996, 1302 (Peter Reith, Minister for 
Industrial Relations). 
3 Workplace Relations Act, 1996, s 170LH (Cth). 
4 Workplace Relations Act, 1996, s 170LJ (1) (Cth). 
5 Workplace Relations Act, 1996, s 170LK (1) (Cth). 
6 Workplace Relations Act, 1996, s 170LJ (1) (Cth). 
7 KAREN WHEELWRIGHT, LABOUR LAW 10.5 (2nd ed. 2003) . 
8 For a discussion of the reduction of union powers with the introduction of the Workplace Relations 
Act, 1996, Cth, see Richard Naughton, ‘Sailing into Unchartered Seas: The Role of Unions Under the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)’ 10 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW 112 (1997)   
9 Part VIB of the WR Act provides for the making of collective agreements without union involvement 
under s 170LK.  Part VID permits employers to enter agreements with individual employees at the 
possible exclusion of the applicable award or certified agreement. 
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III THE ‘FREE-RIDER’ ISSUE 
Under both the award and enterprise bargaining systems, terms and conditions of 
employment that bind an employer in respect to unions and their members are also 
extended to those employees covered by the award or agreement who are not mem-
bers of the union.  This has resulted in a free-rider problem, whereby non-union 
employees obtain the benefit of union endeavours without providing them with any 
financial support.  Recent studies show that around 85 per cent of federally regis-
tered enterprise agreements are made with unions,10 yet union membership stands 
at just 23 per cent of the workforce.11   
 
In Metal Trades Employers Association v Amalgamated Engineering Union12 
(‘Metal Trades’) the High Court held that a dispute between unions and employers 
about the terms on which non-unionists were employed was an industrial matter 
that could give rise to a dispute to be settled by the making of an award.13  The 
union had an industrial interest in ensuring that its members’ employment prospects 
were not undermined by employers being free to engage non-unionists on inferior 
terms.14  The decision therefore, enabled awards in the settlement of industrial 
disputes to bind the employer in relation to all relevant employees, irrespective of 
union membership. 
 
On a strict legal analysis though, an award does not accord rights to a non-union 
employee because he or she is not a party to the award, and is therefore not entitled 
to sue the employer if its terms are breached.15  This situation was overturned in 
1990 when s 178 of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (‘IR Act’) was amended 
to provide that a person whose employment was subject to an award, and who was 
affected by the breach of an award, could sue for breach and recover a penalty.16  In 
relation to certified agreements a similar provision now appears in s 178(5A) of the 
WR Act.  Furthermore, s 179(1) provides that an employee ‘may sue where an 
employer is required by an award, order or certified agreement to pay an amount to 
an employee’.   
 
Thus, the Metal Trades case combined with the subsequent legislative changes 
operated to protect unionists by ensuring that wages and conditions of union labour 
could not be undercut by employers engaging non-union workers on sub-award 
10 Australian Government Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Trends in Federal 
Enterprise Bargaining June 2004 (2004) Australian WorkPlace 
<http://www.workplace.gov.au/WP/Content/Files/WP/WR/Publications/Trends_J04.pdf> (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2004). 
11 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, Australia 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/88F55138D00A58E4CA2568A9001393B9> (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2004). 
12 (1935) 54 CLR 387 (High Court of Australia, 1935). 
13 WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 7, at 8.57. 
14 CREIGHTON, supra note 1, at 4.09. 
15 WHEELWRIGHT, supra note 7 at 8.63. 
16 Id. at 8.64. 
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conditions.  However, in extending such wages and conditions to all employees 
irrespective of union membership, non-unionists were able to benefit from the 
union’s representative activities without providing them with any monetary support. 
 
Under the current enterprise bargaining regime s 170M ensures that collective 
agreements made with unions under Division 2 have application to employees who 
are non-union members.  Furthermore, the AIRC must refuse to certify an agree-
ment that breaches the ‘freedom of association’ provisions in Part XA of the WR 
Act, one requirement of which is that employers do not discriminate in the terms or 
conditions of employment on the basis of union membership.17  Sections 298Y(1) 
and 298Z(3) then go on to provide that an existing certified agreement is void to the 
extent that it breaches Part XA.  
 
The effect of these provisions is that even where an employer negotiates an agree-
ment with a union, it is not possible for the union and the employer to agree that 
only union members will obtain the benefit of the agreement.  Many unionists are 
frustrated by this free-riding problem.  Therefore, the question arises: should em-
ployees who are not members of a union make a contribution to the union who has 
represented the ‘workforce’ in reaching an enterprise agreement with the employer? 
 
IV    UNION SECURITY: THE INTRODUCTION OF                 
BARGAINING FEES  
In order to overcome the free-rider problem and also to ensure their own longevity, 
Australian trade unions have consistently sought to enforce union security arrange-
ments.  In recent times, bargaining agent’s fee clauses have arisen as the latest form 
of union security.  A bargaining agent’s fee is a fee levied on non-union workers 
that is designed to pay unions for their services in negotiating enterprise agreements 
which benefit all employees at a workplace.  However, although bargaining fees 
have the potential to provide a useful financial resource for unions, the charging of 
these fees does not appear to be a universal remedy for all of the current challenges 
faced by the trade union movement. 
 
Bargaining fee clauses are a diluted form of union security compared to those 
arrangements that have formerly existed.  Despite not being sanctioned by the law, 
closed shops have historically been common in Australia.18  In addition, an express 
power previously existed to include provisions in awards directing that preferential 
treatment be given to union members in relation to a range of employment mat-
ters.19  However, the WR Act now provides explicit legal expression for the concept 
of voluntary unionism.  Pursuant to Part XA preference clauses or closed shop 
17 Workplace Relations Act, 1996, ss 170LU(2A), 170LU(3), 298K(1)(e), 298L(1)(b) (Cth). 
18 CREIGHTON, supra note 1, at 12.72. 
19 Industrial Relations Act, 1988, s 122 (Cth). 
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arrangements are unenforceable, as it is unlawful to discriminate against employees 
on the ground that they do not belong to a union.20  
 
The free-rider problem combined with the abolition of preferential treatment for 
union members, the move away from the award system and anxieties created by 
falling union membership prompted the search for new forms of union security.  
This search led a number of unions to attempt to include bargaining fee clauses in 
certified agreements.   
 
In Australia, the impetus for charging bargaining fees gained momentum in June 
2000 when the Australian Council of Trade Unions (‘ACTU’) Congress endorsed 
the following policy: 
 
Provision should be made for certified agreements to include a term pro-
viding that a specified negotiating fee be deducted from the wages of all 
employees covered by the agreement to be forwarded to the relevant un-
ion, with such fee to be offset against union dues if paid by the em-
ployee.21
 
The aim of inserting a bargaining fee clause into a union negotiated enterprise 
agreement under s 170LJ of the WR Act, is ostensibly to prevent non-unionists free-
riding on employees who pay union membership fees.  Unions were attracted to this 
idea and began to levy bargaining fees at a rate above that of ordinary union dues.  
However, an amount set at a level below membership fees, calculated to reflect the 
bargaining and representational work done on a worker’s behalf by a union would 
seem to be the most appropriate means of enforcing a fee upon non-union employ-
ees that is to be strictly regarded as a ‘bargaining’ fee.  Despite the risk that these 
fees may attract lukewarm union members into a lower form of contribution, any 
system which provides additional financial resources to unions by eliciting payment 
from workers who would not otherwise contribute, provides much needed financial 
security for unions.22   
 
In order to reach an agreement containing a bargaining fee clause, unions would 
inevitably have to overcome negative employer responses in many enterprises.23   
Moreover, under s 170LT(5) of the WR Act a union negotiated enterprise bargaining 
agreement must be approved by the majority of employees at a workplace to be 
certifiable.  Even assuming that the broad political arguments as to the merits of 
bargaining fees were won with employees, there would be a big difference between 
that victory and achieving majority support at workplaces where individual workers 
may still be inclined to protect their own hip-pocket.24  Unions would also have to 
20 Workplace Relations Act, 1996, ss 298K, 298L(1)(b) (Cth). 
21 Australian Council of Trade Unions, Industrial Legislation Policy 2000 Australian Council of Trade 
Unions <http://www.actu.asn.au/public/papers/2000leg/> (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) 
22 Graeme Orr, Agency Shops in Australia? Compulsory Bargaining Fees, Union (In) Security and the 
Rights of Free-Riders, 14 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW 1, 17 (2001). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 31. 
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motivate support in each workplace against a possible perception that any union 
security gains would involve a trade-off for other benefits in negotiations.25   
 
It is quite likely that bargaining fee clauses would only achieve majority support in 
highly unionised workplaces.  Yet these may be the areas that least need the extra 
resources or are best placed to organise and recruit members.26  Furthermore, with 
only about 37 per cent of the workforce being covered by collective agreements27 
(21 per cent in the federal jurisdiction)28 and with up to about 15 per cent of these 
employees being covered by non-union agreements29 the coverage that bargaining 
fees have the potential to achieve is not particularly substantial. 
 
The ‘message’ that the fees send about the purpose of trade unions may also be of 
some concern.  This strategy effectively sees unions define themselves as service-
providing agencies and has the potential to undermine the organising capacity of 
trade unions.  New conscripts who may wish to avoid the fee and join the union 
instead, are likely to have a clear focus on union services.30  However, there is more 
to union security than financial security; if a union is merely an agent providing a 
service for its members it cannot effectively organise the workforce in order to 
strengthen its bargaining position in negotiations with employers.31 Therefore, it 
may be a better strategy to overcome the free-rider problem through a more system-
atic focus on organising. 
 
Nevertheless, some level of financial security for unions is necessary to ensure 
collective bargaining occurs on a relatively even playing field.  That goal is de-
pendant on unions being able to service a large number of sites in the system of 
enterprise bargaining, which requires a higher level of resources than most unions 
enjoy.32
V THE LEGAL STATUS OF BARGAINING FEES 
Just as unions began to view bargaining fees as a viable method of funding their 
activities, questions arose as to their validity.  There were many practical conse-
quences dependent upon these questions that remained unresolved despite the 
statutory prohibition of bargaining fees in 2003. Extensive litigation upon facts 
arising before this date saw multiple issues proceed all the way to the High Court, 
which eventually confirmed the demise of bargaining fees as a form of union secu-
rity.  
 
25 Id.. 
26 Id. at 32. 
27 DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS, AGREEMENT MAKING IN AUSTRALIA 
UNDER THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 2000 AND 2001 43 (2003) 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 53. 
30 Rae Cooper, Trade Unionism in 2001, 44(2) JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 247, 257 (2002). 
31 PHILLIPA WEEKS, TRADE UNION SECURITY LAW 260 (1995). 
32 Orr, supra note 22, at 6. 
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A  Certification & Protected Action 
Particularly contentious in the judicial proceedings were the questions as to whether 
bargaining fee clauses could be included in an agreement to be certified by the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (‘AIRC’) and whether unions could 
take industrial action in support of an agreement containing a bargaining fee clause. 
 
1 The Electrolux Litigation 
In this case, trade unions had attempted to include in a collective agreement a term 
that the employer (Electrolux) should:  
a) advise new employees that a bargaining agent’s fee would be payable to 
the union by non-union members; 
b) require new employees to pay the fee; and  
c) provide a direct debit facility to enable the payment of the fee.  
 
Electrolux refused to include the bargaining fee clause in the agreement and as a 
result the unions took industrial action.  This deadlock could not be broken and the 
matter proceeded to the Federal Court for resolution. 
 
Section 170LI(1) of the WR Act provides that, for an application to be made to the 
AIRC under Division 2 for certification of an enterprise bargaining agreement, 
there must be an agreement about matters pertaining to the relationship between an 
employer who is a constitutional corporation and all persons employed in the em-
ployer’s single business.  Electrolux asserted that the bargaining fee clause of the 
agreement was not about a matter pertaining to the relationship between Electrolux 
and its employees under s 170LI(1) and therefore the agreement was not capable of 
being certified.   
 
Further, s 170ML located in Division 8 of Part VIB identifies particular types of 
industrial action, termed ‘protected action’, which attracts certain legal immunities 
pursuant to s 170MT.  Section 170ML(2)(e) provides that an organisation of em-
ployees is entitled, for the purpose of supporting or advancing claims made in 
respect of a proposed agreement to organise or engage in industrial action directly 
against the employer and, if the organisation, member, officer or employee does so, 
the organising of, or engaging in, the industrial action is protected action.  Elec-
trolux claimed that as the agreement was not capable of being certified, the indus-
trial action taken by the unions in support of the agreement could not be deemed to 
be ‘protected action’ within the meaning of s 170ML(2)(e).  
 
At first instance Merkel J, as a single judge of Federal Court,33 upheld Electrolux’s 
propositions, however, his Honour’s decision was overturned on appeal to the Full 
33 Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union [2001] FCA 1600 (Unreported, 
Merkel J, 14 November 2001) (Federal Court of Australia, 2001) (‘Electrolux No 1’). 
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Court of the Federal Court.34  Electrolux subsequently appealed the decision to the 
High Court. 
 
The High Court in Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Un-
ion35 (‘Electrolux No 3’) identified three main questions for determination:  
 
1. Whether a claim by a union that an employer should agree to a bargaining 
agent's fee is a matter pertaining to the relationship between an employer 
and persons employed in the business of the employer, within the meaning 
of s 170LI(1).  
2. Whether the presence of a term in a proposed agreement that is not ‘about 
matters pertaining to the relationship’ between an employer and its em-
ployees within the meaning of s 170LI(1) makes the entire agreement not 
one about such matters for the purposes of that section and therefore not 
capable of being certified by the AIRC. 
3. Whether industrial action by a union in support of claims made for a pro-
posed agreement, which includes a bargaining agent's fee clause that is 
deemed not to pertain to the employment relationship, is protected action 
within the meaning of s 170ML(2)(e).36  
 
(a) Issue 1: Characterisation of the Bargaining Agent's Fee Claim  
In Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (‘Electrolux No. 
1’) Merkel J held that in order for matters to pertain to the relationship between an 
employer and an employee in accordance with s 170LI(1), ‘they must be connected 
with the relationship between an employer in his capacity as an employer and an 
employee in his capacity as an employee in a way which is direct and not merely 
consequential.’37  On his Honour’s reading of previous High Court decisions,38 a 
bargaining fee clause was not a clause that pertains to the relationship between the 
employer and its employees in their capacities as such, because the relationship that 
is created is one of agency in which the employer contracts with its employees on 
behalf of the relevant union, as its agent.39  
 
Doubt was thrown on this conclusion when Electrolux No 1 was appealed to the 
Full Court of the Federal Court in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing 
34 Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union v Electrolux Home 
Products Pty Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 177 (Federal Court of Australia 2001) (‘Electrolux No 2’). 
35 (2004) 209 ALR 116 (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
36 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 199,120 (Gleeson CJ) (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
37 Re Manufacturing Grocers’ Employees Federation of Australia; Ex parte Australian Chamber of 
Manufactures (1986) 160 CLR 341 (High Court of Australia, 1986) as cited with approval in Electrolux 
No 1 [2001] FCA 1600, 20 (Unreported, Merkel J, 14 November 2001) (Federal Court of Australia, 
2001). 
38 R v Portus; Ex parte ANZ Banking Group Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 353 (High Court of Australia, 1972), 
subsequently affirmed in Re Alcan Australia Ltd; Ex Parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and 
Engineering Employees (1994) 181 CLR 96 (High Court of Australia, 1994). 
39 Electrolux No 1 [2001] FCA 1600, 40 - 41 (Unreported, Merkel J, 14 November 2001) (Federal Court 
of Australia, 2001). 
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& Kindred Industries Union v Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd (‘Electrolux No 
2’).  On the facts of the case the Full Court held that Merkel J had incorrectly iden-
tified the issue.  The question was not whether the proposed agreement satisfied s 
170LI(1) so as to be capable of certification, but rather, whether the unions had 
engaged in protected action in accordance with s 170ML(2)(e).  Thus, although the 
Court found it unnecessary to express a final view about all of Merkel J’s conclu-
sions, their Honour’s doubted whether his propositions were correct.40  In relation 
to the characterisation of the bargaining fee clause, the Court stated that a claim by 
a union that an employer impose a requirement on future employees to pay a bar-
gaining fee as a condition of employment ‘might give rise to a matter pertaining to 
the relationship between Electrolux and those employees...’41   
 
However, the law remained in a state of flux, as after this decision, in Re Health 
Minders Limited and National Union of Workers Comprehensive Enterprise 
Agreement 200242 (‘Health Minders Appeal’), a Full Bench of the AIRC endorsed 
the position of Merkel J in ruling that bargaining fee clauses were not matters 
pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees in their capacities 
as such.   
  The High Court in Electrolux No 3 
When the decision in Electrolux No 2 was appealed to the High Court a 6:1 major-
ity determined that a bargaining agent's fee clause does not pertain to the em-
ployer/employee relationship as required by s 170LI(1).43  Similarly to Merkel J, 
the majority followed the previous High Court ruling in Re Alcan Australia Ltd; Ex 
Parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing and Engineering Employees44 (‘Re 
Alcan’).  The issue in Re Alcan was whether a dispute about a demand by a union 
that an employer deduct union dues from its employees' wages and remit them to 
the union was an ‘industrial dispute…about matters pertaining to the relationship 
between employers and employees’ under s 4(1) of the IR Act.  The Court held that 
the demand did not pertain to employer/employee relationship and by analogy, the 
High Court in Electrolux No 3, reached the same conclusion regarding bargaining 
fees. 
 
In Re Alcan, the Court followed its earlier decision in the case of R v Portus; Ex 
parte ANZ Banking Group Ltd45 (‘Portus’).  In Portus, it was held that a demand by 
a union that an employer make deductions from employees wages did not affect the 
industrial relationship of employers and employees under the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) (‘CA Act’).  The High Court in that case concluded that 
a matter must be connected with the relationship between an employer and an 
40 Electrolux No 2 (2002) 118 FCR 177, 196 (Federal Court of Australia, 2002). 
41 Electrolux No 2 (2002) 118 FCR 177, 197 (Federal Court of Australia, 2002).  
42 (2003) 120 IR 438 (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2003). 
43 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in a joint judgment and 
Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Callinan JJ in separate judgments; Kirby J in dissent) (High Court of Austra-
lia, 2004). 
44 (1994) 181 CLR 96 (High Court of Australia, 1994). 
45 (1972) 127 CLR 353 (High Court of Australia, 1972). 
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employee in their capacities as such in order to pertain to the employment relation-
ship.  According to the Court, a dispute about the deduction of union fees did not 
have this connection as it pertained to a relationship involving employees as union 
members, not as employees. The view was taken that the demand to pay union dues 
from the employees’ wages would create a relationship between the parties, in 
which the employer acts as the financial agent of the employee for the benefit of the 
union.46
 
Constitutional Foundation for Division 2 of Part VIB 
Unlike the provisions considered in Re Alcan and Portus, the constitutional founda-
tion for Division 2 is ‘primarily’ the broader corporations power under s 51(xx) of 
the Commonwealth Constitution and not the conciliation and arbitration power 
under s 51(xxxv).47  Even so, the majority held that in Re Alcan and Portus the 
Court's construction of ‘matters pertaining to the relationship between employers 
and employees’ did not depend upon the scope of the conciliation and arbitration 
power but rather the meaning of the definition of 'industrial dispute' in the IR Act 
and ‘industrial matters’ in the CA Act.48   
 
Gleeson CJ and McHugh J agreed that there was nothing in the WR Act to indicate 
that the approach taken in Re Alcan and Portus was no longer applicable. The 
federal Parliament enacted the WR Act two years after the Re Alcan decision, and 
the drafters would have been aware of the interpretation of the language applied by 
the High Court.49  
 
It was further stated by McHugh J that the terms of s 170LI revealed that the section 
was not intended to be commensurate with the scope of the corporations power. The 
constitutional basis of Division 2 was therefore neither determinative of the scope 
of the section nor of itself a reason for distinguishing the earlier cases.50   In Health 
Minders Appeal the AIRC had in fact taken the view that the incorporation of 
s 170LI into the WR Act was intended to confine the broad extent of the corpora-
tions power.51 
 
In dissent, Kirby J opined that without the same constitutional limitations it was 
unnecessary to read down ‘matters pertaining to’ the employer/employee relation-
ship in order to avoid exceeding the bounds of s 51(xxxv).52   His Honour argued 
that the words of s 170LI(1), in stating that the relationship in question is one be-
tween an employee and an ‘employer who is a constitutional corporation’, makes it 
46 Portus (1972) 127 CLR 353, 360 (High Court of Australia, 1972). 
47 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 136 (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
48 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 136 (McHugh J), 156 (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) (High 
Court of Australia, 2004). 
49 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 120 (Gleeson CJ), 138 (McHugh J) (High Court of Australia, 
2004). 
50 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 137 (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
51 (2003) 120 IR 438, 450 (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2003). 
52 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 169 (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
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clear that Parliament had intended to free the WR Act from the limitations of s 51 
(xxxv), and to substitute ‘new and additional reliance’ on the corporations power.53   
 
Further, Kirby J noted that the majority were also reverting back to an outdated 
view of what may be considered the permissible subject of industrial disputation. 
There are references in the judgements of both McHugh J and Callinan J to the 
notion that a dispute over ‘managerial’ issues cannot be considered to be ‘indus-
trial’ in character,54 despite such ideas having been overridden in Re Cram; Ex 
parte NSW Colliery Proprietors’ Association Ltd.55  The majority therefore seemed 
to be confirming the application to certified agreements of the technical case law on 
‘industrial matters’, and also making a retreat from the more liberal view of what 
may be the subject of industrial regulation.56  
 
Text of s 170LI Differs from Sections Considered in Re Alcan & Portus 
The CA Act as considered in Portus required that there be a dispute ‘as to’ a matter 
pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees. Conversely, 
s 170LI(1) requires that there be an agreement ‘about’ matters pertaining to the 
requisite relationship.  
 
Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ observed in Re Amalgamated Metal 
Workers Union; Ex parte Shell Co of Australia Ltd (‘Shell’) that:  
 
As has been seen, the present definition of 'industrial dispute' is satisfied if 
there is a dispute 'about [a] matter ... pertaining to the relationship between 
employers and employees'. And that is satisfied by a less direct relation-
ship than might be necessary in the case of a requirement that a dispute be 
as to an industrial matter.57  
 
Nevertheless, the majority in Electrolux No 3 felt that the decision in Re Alcan 
suggests that the term ‘about’ does not significantly expand the scope of the matters 
that fall within s 170LI(1).58  Kirby J on the other hand, embraced the wider scope 
as identified by the High Court in Shell.  His Honour noted that ‘it was not even 
necessary, as such, that the agreement should actually "pertain to" the relationship 
itself.’59   
 
The differences in interpretation of the language and context of s 170LI(1) allowed 
Kirby J to take a broader view than the majority as to what matters pertain to the 
employment relationship.  His Honour’s judgement is more sensitive to the consti-
53 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 171 (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
54 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 132 (McHugh J), 178 (Callinan J) (High Court of Australia, 
2004). 
55 (1987) 163 CLR 117 (High Court of Australia, 1987). 
56 Andrew Stewart, Electrolux in the High Court: Strict Interpretation, Uncertain Results 9 CCH 
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL LAW NEWS (2004), available at <www.cch.com.au> (last visited Oct. 2004). 
57 (1992) 174 CLR 345, 357 (High Court of Australia, 1992). 
58 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 139 (McHugh J) (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
59 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 171 (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
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tutional context in which the previous decisions were handed down and therefore 
appears to provide a more progressive and realistic interpretation of s 170LI(1).  
Nevertheless, despite taking a conservative view on what may be the subject of 
industrial regulation, the majority in following Re Alcan and Portus made their 
decision on an arguable application of established precedent and statutory interpre-
tation.60
 
In a sense, these more technical arguments did little to obscure the fact that this area 
of law is inextricably linked with political values and ideological beliefs.  In deter-
mining whether bargaining fee clauses pertain to the employment relationship it 
seems difficult to avoid making value judgements about the role of unions in the 
industrial relations system, in fact it is almost necessary to do so.  Ultimately, the 
Court found that a proposal that an employer deduct amounts from the wages of 
future employees and remit them to a trade union was not one that affected employ-
ers and employees in their capacities as such.  The majority held, as espoused by 
McHugh J, that:  
 
Notwithstanding that a bargaining agent's fee may contribute indirectly to 
the enforcement of employment conditions and may be relevant to each 
employment relationship, this does not alter the characterisation of the re-
lationship created between employer and employee by the bargaining 
agent's fee clause as an "agency" relationship in which the employer effec-
tively acts as the union's agent in making the relevant payment.61   
 
Thus, the majority focused on the legal technicalities of the requirement and not 
what lies behind the agency relationship.  Furthermore, the Court followed the 
decision in Re Alcan in stating that despite the importance of unions in the bargain-
ing process, a claim directed to strengthening the position of a union or union 
members was not, without more, a matter pertaining to the employment relationship 
involving employers, as such, and employees, as such.62   
 
Kirby J on the other hand, argued that:  
 
in the context of contemporary employment issues in Australia - where 
questions of enterprise bargaining, the role of unions in it and the terms of 
the Act continue to make such issues highly pertinent ones on the shop 
floor - the notion that the Unions' claim is one about matters pertaining to 
the employment relationship is irresistible.63   
 
His Honour felt that the real work of s 170LI(1) was to exclude from agreements 
wholly extraneous demands having no relevant connection to the particular em-
ployment relationship.64  According to Kirby J, it was unconvincing to suggest that 
60 Stewart, supra note 56.  
61 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 140 (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
62 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 133 (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
63 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 172 (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
64 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 172 (High Court of Australia, 2004) 
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the Unions' demand for the fee pertained solely to the relationship between employ-
ees and the Unions and that least of all it is convincing to say that it was not about 
matters pertaining to the employment relationship.65   
 
Objectively it does seem as though union security has a clear, rational and direct 
impact on the enforcement of employment standards, their maintenance and im-
provement.66  Bargaining agent’s fees are ‘necessarily incidental to the bargaining 
and enforcement process without which certified agreements would not exist.’67  
There is little content to the employment relationship in a workplace principally 
governed by Division 2 certified agreements, without a process of collective nego-
tiation and continuing representation and oversight. An arrangement mandating that 
employees contribute to funding that process could be considered to be of direct 
relevance to the employment relationship.68  However, this argument did not prove 
convincing to the majority of the High Court.  
 
(b)  Issue 2: Certification of an Agreement Which Contains a Term That Is 
Not a Matter Pertaining to the Requisite Relationship  
In Electrolux No 1 s 170LI(1) was interpreted as precluding an agreement from 
being certified if it contains a clause that is substantive, discrete and significant, and 
which does not pertain to the employment relationship.69  However, if a term within 
an agreement not pertaining to the employment relationship is ancillary or inciden-
tal to, or is a machinery provision relating to, a matter pertaining to the employment 
relationship then the agreement may still be certified.70  Merkel J found the bar-
gaining agent’s fee clause to be substantive, discrete and significant and not pertain-
ing to the employment relationship, thus the agreement could not be certified under 
s 170LI(1).71 Following this decision the question as to whether bargaining fee 
clauses pertain to the employment relationship came before the AIRC on a number 
of occasions in the context of applications for certification.  Some agreements were 
certified with the AIRC distinguishing Electrolux No 1 on the basis that the applica-
tion dealt with claims rather than a concluded agreement, while others were refused 
certification.72
 
65 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 172 (High Court of Australia, 2004).  
66 Orr, supra note 22, at 21. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Electrolux No 1, [2001] FCA 1600, 51 (Unreported, Merkel J, 14 November 2001) (High Court of 
Australia 2001). 
70 Electrolux No 1, [2001] FCA 1600, 50 (Unreported, Merkel J, 14 November 2001) (High Court of 
Australia 2001). 
71 Electrolux No 1, [2001] FCA 1600, 54 (Unreported, Merkel J, 14 November 2001) (High Court of 
Australia 2001). 
72 Sam Eichembaum and Deivina Peethampparham, What’s it all about?, 78(5) LAW INSTITUTE 
JOURNAL 60 (2003).  See Re Webforge NSW Certified Agreement 2001 (unreported: PR914378, AIRC, 
18 February 2002) (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2002) for an example of a decision 
dealing with a concluded agreement.  See Health Minders Appeal, (2003) 120 IR 438 (Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission, 2003) and Atlas Steels, (2002) 114 IR 62 (Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission, 2002) for examples of decisions dealing with a claim. 
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Conversely, on appeal the Full Court of the Federal Court looked at the plain mean-
ing of the words in s 170LI(1) that refer to ‘an agreement ... about matters pertain-
ing to the relationship.’ In light of these words the Court considered it is necessary 
to characterise the ‘agreement itself, considering it as a whole.’73  Their Honours 
concluded that there was ‘nothing in the statutory scheme suggesting that a certified 
agreement that, considered as a whole, answers to the description of 170LI(1), may 
not include a particular term that does not.’74  However, in Health Minders Appeal 
the AIRC held that the Federal Court in Electrolux No 2 was incorrect, in that an 
agreement containing matters that do not pertain to the employer/employee rela-
tionship cannot be classed as an agreement about matters pertaining to that relation-
ship.75
 
Following these decisions and the introduction of the statutory prohibition of bar-
gaining fees, the AIRC in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and 
Kindred Industries Union & Ors v Unilever Australia Ltd76 (‘Unilever’)  adopted a 
more liberal approach to the issue, and expanded on the decision handed down 
Electrolux No 2.  Rather than examining each provision individually, it was said 
that the language of s 170LI(1) requires the agreement to be assessed objectively 
and as a whole in determining whether it pertains to the employment relationship in 
the ‘actual business under consideration’.77  The AIRC noted that ‘the reference 
relationship is not the abstract construct developed for purposes of identifying a 
constitutional industrial dispute or the statutory counterpart of it.’ 78  Therefore, 
read in conjunction with the objects of the WR Act, 79 s 170LI(1) was said to allow 
the parties to best judge subjectively what rights and duties come within their own 
employment agreement.80  The result of this decision was that whether or not a 
bargaining fee clause in isolation was held to pertain to the employment relation-
ship, the agreement as a whole could still be deemed to pertain to that relationship 
and therefore be capable of certification. 
 The High Court in Electrolux No 3 
Contrary to this interpretation of the WR Act the High Court’s view was that an 
agreement cannot be certified if it contains a clause that does not pertain to the 
relationship between the employer and employees concerned.  The majority con-
cluded that there was nothing in the text or the scheme of Part VIB to find that an 
73 Electrolux No 2, [2002] 118 FCR 177, 196 (Federal Court of Australia, 2002). 
74 Electrolux No 2, [2002] 118 FCR 177, 196 (Federal Court of Australia, 2002). 
75 Leigh Johns, To Certify Or Not To Certify – That Is (Still) the Question, 16 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF 
LABOUR LAW 108, 117 (2003). 
76 (unreported, PR940027, AIRC, Full Court, 31 October 2003) (Australian Industrial Relations Com-
mission, 2003). 
77 Eichembaum and Peethampparham, supra note 72. 
78Unilever (unreported, PR940027, AIRC, Full Court, 31 October 2003), 163 (Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission, 2003). 
79 The objects of the WR Act include: 3(b) ensuring that the primary responsibility for determining 
matters affecting the relationship between employers and employees rests with the employer and em-
ployees at the workplace or enterprise level.  3(c) enabling employers and employees to choose the most 
appropriate form of agreement for their particular circumstances, whether or nor that form is provided 
for by this Act. 
80 This was said to be the case unless the agreement was considered to be a ‘sham’. 
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agreement that contains matters other than those referred to in s 170LI may be the 
subject of a certified agreement.  
 
Presumably though, as Merkel J held, if a term within an agreement does not per-
tain to the employment relationship, but is ancillary or incidental to, or is a machin-
ery provision relating to, a matter pertaining to the employment relationship then 
the agreement may still be certified.  Only McHugh J expressly approved Merkel J's 
finding on this point, though the other members of the majority may be taken to 
have implicitly accepted it by referring to his Honour’s judgment with approval.81  
Therefore, it appears as though it is only the inclusion of substantive, discrete and 
significant provisions not pertaining to the employment relationship that will pre-
vent an agreement from being certified. 82
 
In coming to its decision the High Court relied upon the comments of the Full 
Bench of the AIRC in Re Atlas Steels Distribution Certified Agreement 2001-2003 
(‘Atlas Steels’).  In that case it was held that the construction, as subsequently 
adopted by the Full Court of the Federal Court:  
 
gives rise to uncertainty in the application of the section and of the Divi-
sion.  It requires a weighing-up or balancing of provisions which are about 
matters which do pertain and those which do not in order to reach a con-
clusion as to whether the agreement as a whole is about matters which per-
tain.  That might involve difficult value judgments in particular cases. 83   
 
The High Court also observed that the WR Act is silent on the procedure for certify-
ing an agreement which contains terms about matters that do not pertain to the 
employment relationship, and on the effect of certification of such an agreement.84  
Furthermore, it was stated that it would be anomalous if the WR Act conferred 
statutory privileges and enforced penalties in relation to substantive matters in a 
certified agreement that did not pertain to the requisite relationship under s 
170LI(1).85
 
However, it seems that the view expressed by the AIRC in Unilever and referred to 
by Kirby J with approval in his dissent86 is to be preferred, in that it promotes a 
simpler and more industrially realistic interpretation of the WR Act.87  The charac-
terisation of each provision of an agreement, as the High Court’s decision requires, 
is certainly more arduous than the characterisation of an entire agreement.  Fur-
thermore, the problems identified by the High Court in characterising an agreement 
81 K L Ballantyne & National Union of Workers (unreported, PR952656, Ross VP, 22 October 2004) 36 
– 41, (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2004). 
82 This approach was confirmed in Section 45 appeal against decision (PR952449) by Australian Nursing 
Federation, (PR956575, Giudice J, Lawler VP and Simmonds C, 18 March 2005), (Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission, 2005). 
83 (2002) 114 IR 62, 67 (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2002). 
84 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 122 (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
85 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 145 (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
86 Electrolux No 3  (2004) 209 ALR 116, 165 (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
87 Stewart, supra note 56. 
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as a whole, seem to be less significant compared to the complexity that the major-
ity’s approach will bring to the negotiation of agreements.  The decision of the High 
Court will ensure that a great deal of time is spent on obtaining advice about, or 
disputing, what can or cannot be included in an agreement.  It seems that if the 
parties are to have true freedom in determining the terms of their employment 
relationship, as identified in the objects of the WR Act, s 170LI(1) should be af-
forded the broader construction as adopted in Unilever.88
 
(c)  Issue 3: Whether Industrial Action in Support of a Proposed (Non-
Certifiable) Agreement is "Protected Action" 
In Electrolux No 1 Merkel J held that industrial action taken for the purpose of 
supporting or advancing a proposed agreement that was incapable of being certified 
was not ‘protected action’ under the WR Act.  On the other hand, the Full Court of 
the Federal Court held that 170ML(2)(e) is concerned only with the purpose of the 
relevant organisation or individuals and not with their ‘realism, or legal knowledge 
or the likely result of their industrial action.’  Provided the claims are genuinely 
made ‘in respect of the proposed agreement’, however ‘optimistically or misguid-
edly,’ the industrial action taken to advance them falls within the scope of s 
170ML(2)(e).  It does not matter that the insertion of a provision would give rise to 
certification difficulty under s 170LI(1).89
 
 The High Court in Electrolux No 3 
The High Court, again with a 6:1 majority, agreed with the decision of Merkel J, 
that industrial action does not become protected merely because the party taking the 
action is genuinely advancing claims that they wish to see included in an agree-
ment.  It was said that industrial action is not 'protected’ under the WR Act unless 
the proposed agreement can be certified.  In this case, the presence of the bargain-
ing fee clause meant that the agreement was not certifiable, and hence industrial 
action in support of the agreement was not protected action.  
 
McHugh J, undertaking a close analysis of the statute, held that the ‘proposed 
agreement’ that the action must be taken to support or advance is identified in 
s 170MI(1) as that which the initiating party ‘wants to negotiate’, being ‘an agree-
ment under Division 2’.  In the context of Part VIB, the term ‘under’ was said to be 
understood to mean meeting the requirements or specifications set out in Divi-
sion 2.  Accordingly, the ‘proposed agreement’ has to be an agreement that satisfies 
the requirements for the making of an application to the AIRC for certification. 
Those requirements include that the agreement must pertain to the employment 
relationship as mandated by s 170LI(1).90  
 
The protection conferred by s 170ML(2)(e), was therefore deemed to operate if the 
following two criteria are satisfied:  
88 Eichembaum et al, supra note 77, at 61. 
89 Electrolux No 2 (2002) 118 FCR 177, 194 -197, (Federal Court of Australia, 2002). 
90 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 146, (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
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1. the action has the genuine purpose of supporting or advancing claims the 
subject of a proposed agreement; and  
2. the nature of the proposed agreement satisfies the requirements of 
s 170LI(1).91 
 
Furthermore, it was held that a party, in taking industrial action, may contravene the 
prohibition in s 170NC against ‘coercion’ in relation to the making of an agreement, 
even if it turns out that the agreement they are seeking is not one that may be certi-
fied.  Accordingly, unions will need to be very careful as to the basis on which they 
seek to take protected action.92  
 
With such consequences in mind, Kirby J took a more practical, realistic approach 
to the question.  According to his Honour, the very generality of the words of con-
nection (‘for the purpose of’ and ‘in respect of’) support a broad interpretation of 
s 170ML(2)(e).93  Consistent with this interpretation, Kirby J agreed with the com-
ments of North J in Australian Paper Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, 
Energy and Allied Services Union, as approved by the Federal Court in Electrolux 
No 2, that:  
 
the purpose of this statutory scheme is to allow negotiating parties, both 
employer and employee, maximum freedom consistent with a civilised 
community to take industrial action in aid of the negotiation of agreements 
without legal liability for that action.94
 
Again in much the same vein as the Court in Electrolux No 2, Kirby J acknowl-
edged the realities of industrial relations that make it clear that ‘dramatic conse-
quences’ can flow from denying protection to a union for industrial action taken in 
support of a proposed agreement.  His Honour believed that it would be an exces-
sive outcome if the mere inclusion in a ‘proposed agreement’ of a clause that might 
later be found to be outside the ambit of that which can be certified by the AIRC 
would deprive the industrial organisation propounding it of protection under 
Part VIB of the WR Act.95  The union might scrupulously go through all of the 
formalities contemplated by the Act, yet all such precautions could be set at nought 
by a subsequent judicial declaration.96  According to Kirby J, to expose an indus-
trial organisation of employees to serious civil liability for industrial action, deter-
mined years later to have been ‘unprotected’, ‘is to introduce a serious chilling 
effect into the negotiations that such organisations can undertake on behalf of their 
members.’97
 
91 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 147, (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
92 Stewart, supra note 56. 
93 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 165, (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
94 (1998) 81 IR 15, 18, (Federal Court of Australia, 1998). 
95 Electrolux No 3 (2004) 209 ALR 116, 163, (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
96 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 163-164, (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
97 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 163-164, (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
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Although the majority’s decision can be justified on a strict interpretation of the 
statute, Kirby J’s interpretation of s 170ML(2)(e) leads to a more workable conclu-
sion.  In consideration of the heavy liability that can flow from a declaration that 
industrial action is not protected, it seems unrealistic to expect an industrial organi-
sation to have the foresight to determine whether every single clause of an agree-
ment pertains to the employment relationship before taking industrial action.  
Therefore, given the supposed freedoms that industrial parties are granted to engage 
in industrial action to aid their negotiations, it seems more realistic to deem action 
as protected where it is taken for the genuine purpose of supporting or advancing 
claims that are the subject of a proposed agreement. 
 
 Effect of the Electrolux No 3 Decision 
Therefore, the High Court by a 6:1 majority held that: 
• a bargaining agent’s fee clause does not pertain to the employment rela-
tionship under s 170LI(1); 
• a bargaining agent’s fee clause is substantive, discrete and significant and 
therefore cannot be included in a certified agreement under s 170LI(1); and 
• industrial action in support of a claim to include a bargaining agent’s fee 
clause in a certified agreement is not protected action under s 
170ML(2)(e).98 
 
More generally, the effect of the High Court’s decision was threefold: 
• the AIRC will not have the power to certify agreements which contain any 
substantive, discrete and significant provisions that do not relate to the re-
lationship between employers and their employees; 
• existing agreements which the AIRC had purported to certify may not have 
been legally binding if they contained any terms that were substantive, dis-
crete and significant which did not relate to the employment relationship; 
and 
• industrial action taken in support of agreements that cannot be certified 
will not be protected industrial action. 
 
On a practical level, the strict reasoning adopted by the majority in reaching its 
conclusion regarding the characterisation of bargaining fee clauses may throw into 
question many provisions that have previously been included in certified agree-
ments.  It seems likely that the decision will introduce greater complexity into the 
conduct of enterprise bargaining at federal level.99  
 
98 See Section 45 appeal against decision (PR952449) by Australian Nursing Federation, (PR956575, 
Giudice J, Lawler VP and Simmonds C, 18 March 2005) (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 
2005) in which the AIRC provided a summary of the law in this area following Electrolux No 3. 
99 See for example K L Ballantyne & National Union of Workers (unreported, PR952656, Ross VP, 22 
October 2004) (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2004) and section 45 appeal against 
decision (PR952449) by Australian Nursing Federation, (PR956575, Giudice J, Lawler VP and Sim-
monds C, 18 March 2005) (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2005) which deal with disputes 
as to whether certain clauses do or do not pertain to the employment relationship.   
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Unions may be able to overcome the effect of the High Court’s decision by settling 
two agreements with an employer; one certified under the WR Act containing provi-
sions limited to matters pertaining to the relationship between the employer and 
employee as prescribed by s 170LI(1), and the second being an unregistered agree-
ment dealing with other agreed matters.  However, it is difficult to construct unreg-
istered agreements that satisfy all the requirements of a common law contract to 
ensure the agreement is enforceable.100  
 
Questions have also arisen concerning what is to occur to an agreement that con-
tains a clause(s) that does not pertain to the employment relationship but is brought 
before the AIRC for certification.  There was some suggestion by McHugh J that 
the clause(s) that is not certifiable may operate at general law,101 whilst the remain-
der of the agreement is certified, but this again encounters the difficulties of enforc-
ing an unregistered agreement.  The answer now appears to be that if the agreement 
requires amendment in order to satisfy the requirements of s 170LI(1) the changes 
must be implemented through the same process as is required for the making of 
agreements under the WR Act.102
 
In the case of an existing agreement containing a clause that does not pertain to the 
employment relationship, the effect of Electrolux No 3 may have been to render the 
entire agreement invalid.  In relation to bargaining fee clauses, such consequences 
may have been averted by the amendments to the WR Act prohibiting bargaining 
fees.  Included in these amendments is the power to remove clauses that purport to 
impose bargaining fees, it would therefore seem that such agreements are not inva-
lid, but rather just that the offending clause will be removed from the agreement.103
 
In any event, the Federal Government has directly dealt with this issue by passing 
the Workplace Relations Amendment (Agreement Validation) Act 2004 (Cth) 
(‘WRAAV Act’).  The WRAV Act validates agreements that were certified, varied or 
approved on or before 2 September 2004 by preventing those matters that do not 
pertain to the employer/employee relationship rendering the entire agreement inva-
lid.104  The WRAAV Act does not validate these non-pertaining matters, it merely 
allows the rest of the agreement to remain operational.  
 
100 See Ryan (rec & mgr of Homfray Carpets Australia Pty Ltd) v Textile Clothing & Footwear Union of 
Australia, [1996] 2 VR 235 (Supreme Court of Victoria, 1996). 
101 Electrolux No 3, (2004) 209 ALR 116, 143 (High Court of Australia, 2004). 
102 K L Ballantyne & National Union of Workers (unreported, PR952656, Ross VP 22 October 2004), 
264 (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2004).  For a union negotiated enterprise agreement 
this would require the conditions under s 170LJ to be adhered to.  However, also see Re Independent 
Supermarkets Certified Agreement 2002 (PR922821) (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 
2002) and Icon Plastics Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers Union (PR953215, Richards C 15 November 
2004) (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2004) where the AIRC has endorsed a ‘negative’ 
approval process for the amendment of an agreement. 
103 Workplace Relations (Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Act, 2003, s 298Z (Cth).  
104 Workplace Relations Amendment (Agreement Validation) Act, 2004, ss 170NHA and 170NHB 
(Cth). 
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The WRAAV Act also provides a limited validation for industrial action, however, 
the changes do little to address the concerns expressed by Kirby J.  The amending 
legislation merely validates protected industrial action taken prior to Electrolux No 
3 that might have been deemed unprotected as it was taken in support of non-
pertaining matters.105  It does not address the disincentive for unions to take indus-
trial action in the future because it is still the case following Electrolux No 3 that 
industrial action taken in pursuit of a proposed agreement containing non-pertaining 
matters will not be protected. 
 
Position in the Australian States 
The Industrial Relations Commissions of both New South Wales and South Austra-
lia have held that bargaining fee clauses may be included in certified agreements, 
depending on the precise nature of the clause.  However, it has been acknowledged 
in both jurisdictions that the structure of local industrial legislation has enabled the 
respective Commissions to take a broader view as to what may be included in a 
certified agreement compared to the view taken at the federal level.106   
 
Section 141(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) offers a closer compari-
son to the WR Act in providing that an agreement cannot be certified if it contains a 
provision that is not about the relationship between the employer and employees.  
In AWU v Skills Training Mackay107 the Full Bench held that certified agreements 
may not contain bargaining fee clauses because the fee is not a matter that relates to 
the relationship between an employer and its employees.  
 
Thus, despite some support for the concept of bargaining fee clauses, the position of 
the High Court in regard to the legal status of bargaining fees in the federal jurisdic-
tion is largely confirmed by the position in the State with legislation most closely 
reflecting the WR Act.  
 
Regardless of these decisions of the State Industrial Relations Commissions, the 
Federal Government has now introduced the Workplace Relations Amendment 
(Extended Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2005 to amend the freedom 
of association provisions of the WR Act to extend the prohibition on bargaining fee 
clauses to State employment agreements to which a constitutional corporation is a 
party.  
 
 
 
105 Workplace Relations Amendment (Agreement Validation) Act, 2004, s 170NHB (Cth). 
106 In Re: Review of the Principles for Approval of Enterprise Agreements 2002 (2002) 121 IR 144  
(New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission, 2002) the Industrial Relations Commission of 
NSW looked at the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW).  In Ian Gregory Morrison Pty 
Ltd (SA) Pty Ltd Security Officers Enterprise Agreement 2002-2004 [2003] SAIRComm 36 (South 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2003), the SA Industrial Relations Commission looked at 
the provisions of Industrial and Employee Relations Act (1996) (SA). 
107 (2002) 51 AILR 9-206 (Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, 2002). 
429   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 10 NO 2 
 
                                                          
 
B  Freedom of Association Provisions 
It is also an individual’s right to freedom of association that is said to be in jeopardy 
by the imposition of bargaining fees.  The objects of the WR Act in s 3 include, to 
promote the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia by: 
 
(f) ensuring freedom of association including the rights of employees and 
employers to join an organisation or association of their choice, or not to 
join an organisation or association. 
 
In The Employment Advocate and Accurate Factory Maintenance Labour Hire 
Enterprise Agreement 2000-2003108 (‘Accurate Factory Maintenance’) the Em-
ployment Advocate (EA) intervened in the certification process of agreements that 
contained bargaining fee clauses.  The EA argued that the clauses were in breach of 
the freedom of association provisions under Part XA of the WR Act.    
 
Despite Part XA having been subsequently amended to give it a broader opera-
tion109 the provisions dealt with in this case still exist under the current WR Act.  
Pursuant to s 298K(1) of Part XA, employers must not, for a prohibited reason, or 
for reasons that include a prohibited reason, do or threaten to do any of the follow-
ing: 
a) dismiss an employee; 
b) injure an employee in his or her employment; 
c) alter the position of an employee to the employee’s prejudice; 
d) refuse to employ another person or; 
e) discriminate against another person in the terms or conditions on which the 
employer offers to employ the other person. 
 
Under s 298L prohibited reasons include, a situation in which an employee is not, 
or does not wish, to become a member of a union.  Thus, an employer must not 
perform any of the actions listed under s 298K(1) for this reason.   
 
Any attempt to include a clause in an agreement that provides for behaviour breach-
ing s 298K of Part XA would render the offending clause invalid.  This is made 
clear by s 170LU(2A) of the WR Act which provides that the AIRC must refuse to 
certify any agreement containing objectionable provisions.110  Objectionable provi-
sions are defined in s 298Z(5) to include provisions of an award or a certified 
agreement that require or permit any conduct that would contravene Part XA.  
Section 298Z(3) goes on to require the AIRC to remove ‘objectionable provisions’ 
from existing certified agreements.  More broadly, s 298Y(1) of the WR Act stipu-
108 (unreported, PR910205, AIRC, Full Court, 12 October 2001) (Australian Industrial Relations Com-
mission, 2001). 
109 See Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Act, 2003 (No 2), 
(Cth). 
110 Workplace Relations Act, 1996, s 170LU(2A) (Cth). 
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lates that ‘a provision of an industrial instrument, or an agreement or arrangement, 
is void to the extent that it requires or permits, or has the effect of requiring or 
permitting, any conduct that would contravene’ the prohibitions in Part XA con-
cerning freedom of association.  
 
In Accurate Factory Maintenance the EA therefore, argued that the agreements 
contained objectionable provisions preventing certification of the agreements under 
s 170LU(2A), because the bargaining fee clause provided for conduct that would 
violate Part XA of the WR Act.  The compulsory payment of a fee to a union at the 
direction of the employer, the EA submitted, required or permitted conduct within 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of s 298K(1).  Further, the EA argued, to offer employment 
to a person on the condition that a fee of this kind is payable to a union requires or 
permits conduct within paragraph (e) of s 298K(1). 
 
However, a Full Bench of the AIRC held that the bargaining fee clause was not 
objectionable:111
 
• The clause did not require employees to discriminate between mem-
bers and non-members when offering terms of employment under s 
298K(1)(e) because the fee applied to all employees. 
• The discriminatory action alleged would only arise when the union 
waived the bargaining fee for members.  Such an action would not be 
in breach of s 298K(1), which only covers conduct by an employer. 
• The bargaining fee clause would bind employees via the contract of 
employment and the agreement and could not be waived by the union.  
The likelihood that the fee obligations would only be enforced against 
non-members did not alter the legal character of the obligations. 
• The term in the agreement did not constitute adverse conduct under s 
298K(1), so no question of a proscribed reason arose under s 298L(1). 
 
Thus, as the legislation stood prior to the amendments to the WR Act bargaining fee 
clauses did not breach the freedom of association provisions. 
 
VI STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF BARGAINING FEES 
After the decision in Accurate Factory Maintenance, the federal government made 
its third attempt to take legislative action in order to prohibit bargaining fees.  This 
time they were successful, and the Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of 
Compulsory Union Fees) Act 2003 (No 2) (Cth) came into effect on 9 May 2003.  It 
amended the certified agreement and freedom of association provisions of the WR 
Act so as to proscribe clauses in certified agreements that purported to require the 
payment of a bargaining services fee. 
111 Accurate Factory Maintenance (unreported, PR910205, AIRC, Full Court, 12 October 2001) 33 
(Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 2001). 
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The amending Act defines a number of terms under s 298B(1): 
• ‘Bargaining Services’ are defined as services provided by or on behalf 
of an industrial association in relation to the negotiation, making, cer-
tification, operation, extension, variation or termination of an agree-
ment under Part VIB of the WR Act. 
• ‘Bargaining services fee’ is defined as a fee, however described, pay-
able to an industrial association or to someone else in lieu of an indus-
trial association wholly or partly for the provision, or purported 
provision, of bargaining services.  This definition ensures that provi-
sions of the amended WR Act apply in cases where an industrial asso-
ciation purports to, but has not in fact, provided bargaining services in 
respect of which it is claiming a fee.  Membership dues are specifi-
cally exempted from the definition. 
 
The amendments: 
• prevent the AIRC from certifying an agreement that contains a provi-
sion requiring the payment of a bargaining services fee (s 
170LU(2A)); 
•      make clear that a clause in a certified agreement is void to the extent 
that it requires payment of a bargaining services fee (s 298Y(2)); 
•      extend the definition of objectionable provision in s 298Z(5) so that it 
includes ‘a provision of a certified agreement that requires payment of 
a bargaining services fee’.  (This allows the AIRC to remove these 
clauses on application by a party to the agreement or the Office of the 
EA); 
• prohibit employers and others (eg persons who engage independent 
contractors) from engaging in discriminatory or injurious conduct (eg 
dismissal or refusal to employ) against an employee or an independent 
contractor, because he or she has refused to pay, or does not propose 
to pay, a bargaining services fee (s 298L(1)); 
• prohibit an industrial association from taking action or inciting others 
to take action prejudicing a person in their employment because of 
their refusal to pay a bargaining services fee (s 298Q); 
• prohibit an industrial association from encouraging or inciting others   
to take discriminatory action prejudicing a person because he or she 
has refused to pay, or does not propose to pay, a bargaining services 
fee (s 298S); 
• prohibit an industrial association from demanding a bargaining ser-
vices fee from another person (s 298SA); 
•      prohibit an industrial association from taking action (or threatening to 
take action) against a person with intent to coerce that person, or an-
other person, to pay a bargaining services fee (s 298SB); and 
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• prohibit a person making a false or misleading representation about 
another person’s liability to pay a bargaining services fee (s 
298SC).112  
 
The WRAPCUF Act, in extending the definition of objectionable provision under s 
298Z(5) to cover provisions under a certified agreement requiring the payment of a 
bargaining services fee, allows such a provision to be removed from a certified 
agreement regardless of whether it is deemed to otherwise offend the freedom of 
association provisions under Part XA.  This rectifies the deficiency in the WR Act as 
identified by the government following the decision in Accurate Factory Mainte-
nance.  Furthermore, by listing as a prohibited reason for engaging in prohibited 
conduct ‘that an employee has not paid or agreed to pay a bargaining services 
fee’,113 the amendments also make the charging of bargaining fees contrary to the 
freedom of association provisions under Part XA, and therefore capable of falling 
within the definition of objectionable provision as it existed prior to the amend-
ments.  The practical effect of this does not extend too far beyond the decision of 
the High Court in Electrolux No 3.  Under both the High Court decision and the 
WRAPCUF Act, agreements containing bargaining fee clauses cannot be certified 
and those in existing agreements are not enforceable.  The only apparent difference 
is that the WRPCUF Act expressly provides for the removal of bargaining fee 
clauses from agreements.  This may be important in prevent the offending clause 
from invalidating the entire agreement. 
 
The WRPCUF Act does not prevent people from making 'voluntary' contributions to 
a union, provided there is no coercion or misrepresentation involved.  Thus, the 
payment of bargaining fees is endorsed in circumstances of individual consent as 
opposed to majority consent.  However, in effect this leaves the concept of bargain-
ing fees largely redundant. 
 
In addition to the prohibition of bargaining fees in federally certified agreements, 
the government has signalled its intention to exclude bargaining fees from State 
agreements through its introduction of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Ex-
tended Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2004.  The Bill seeks to amend 
the freedom of association provisions to provide that a bargaining fee clause in a 
State employment agreement to which a constitutional corporation is a party is 
void.  To achieve this the Bill would: 
 
• amend the definition of bargaining services in s 298B(1) to include 
services provided by an industrial association in relation to a State 
employment agreement; and 
• amend s298Y to provide that a provision of a State employment 
agreement to which a constitutional corporation is a party is void to 
the extent that it requires the payment of a bargaining services fee. 
 
112 CCH, AUSTRALIAN LABOUR LAW REPORTER, vol 4 (at 336-10-04) 57-218. 
113 Workplace Relations Act, 1996, s 298L(1)(o) (Cth). 
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If successfully passed through Parliament these amendments will overcome the 
effect of the Commission decisions in both NSW and SA and preclude the inclusion 
of bargaining fee clauses in State certified agreements in the same way that they are 
precluded from inclusion in federally certified agreements pursuant to ss 298Z and 
298Y of the WR Act. 
 
VII SHOULD UNIONS BE ENTITLED TO CHARGE                  
BARGAINING FEES?  
The government passed the WRPCUF Act at a time when there was litigation before 
the courts concerning the validity of bargaining fee clauses.  If the courts had been 
prepared to say that bargaining fees could be included in certified agreements, why 
was the government so keen to impose itself?  Was this justified on broad public 
policy grounds supporting freedom of association or was it part of a general anti-
union agenda? 
 
A   Freedom of Association 
In his second reading speech introducing the Workplace Relations and Other Legis-
lation Amendment Bill 1996 (Cth) (‘WROLA Bill’) the Honourable Peter Reith 
MP, identified the principle of freedom of association as being ‘…[a]mong the 
fundamental principles underpinning the government’s industrial relations pol-
icy’.114  The principle of freedom of association is promoted by the WR Act by 
ensuring that employers, employees and independent contractors are free to join, or 
not to join, an industrial association of their choice and are also protected from 
victimisation and discrimination regardless of that choice.115  It was argued in the 
Second Reading Speech to the Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of 
Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2002 [No. 2] that while the use of bargaining fees in 
certified agreements might not have technically contravened freedom of association 
provisions, one could not ignore the financial reality of the fees; under the pain of a 
service fee or the penalty of disciplinary action the individual non-unionist is drawn 
towards taking out union membership.116   
 
The demand for a fee for bargaining services does not expressly remove the right of 
an individual to join or not to join an industrial association.  It is arguable though, 
that the structure and amount of a fee charged for the provision of bargaining ser-
vices may coerce an individual to join an industrial association.  A bargaining fee 
114 SECOND READING SPEECH TO THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT 
BILL 1996, supra n 2. 
115 Workplace Relations Act, 1996, Part XA (Cth). There is debate as to whether the freedom of associa-
tion can also include the ‘negative right’ to disassociate; however, the government seems to have 
accepted that there is such a right for the purposes of their legislation. 
116 Commonwealth, Second Reading Speech to the Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of 
Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2002 [No. 2], House of Representatives, 20 February 2002, 501, 502 
(Tony Abbott, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations). 
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clause demanding an amount in excess of union dues, or even the equivalent to, 
would appear to be primarily aimed at increasing declining union membership.  
Conversely, ‘fair share’ fees set below ordinary union dues, designed to cover 
bargaining services alone, seem to provide a reasonable compromise between 
overcoming the free-rider problem and maintaining respect for the concept of 
voluntary unionism.117  Such a practice occurs in many overseas jurisdictions and 
both the ACTU and the Australian Labor Party were willing to consider this type of 
arrangement.118  However, it was ignored by the government, suggesting that the 
passing of the WRPCUF Act was not motivated by any broad concern to protect 
freedom of association but rather to undermine a potential resource base for unions. 
 
Furthermore, bargaining fees are sanctioned by the International Labour Organisa-
tion (ILO) principles and standards, which are founded on core doctrines such as 
freedom of association.  The ILO’s General Survey explicitly states that ‘bargaining 
fee provisions, when negotiated between unions and employers, are consistent with 
freedom of association principles.’119  The fact that the ILO considers that bargain-
ing fees are not contrary to the principle of freedom of association again indicates a 
political agenda behind the government’s actions that cannot be justified on broader 
public policy grounds. 
 
B User-pays 
Enterprise bargaining is very resource intensive.  Unions must provide personnel to 
attend the workplace in order to assist employees in the negotiation and the drafting 
of agreements, and also to oversee the certification process in the AIRC.  The 
amendments to the WR Act allow employees to enjoy the advantages of these union 
endeavours without any associated obligations.  Bargaining fees conform to the 
user-pays principle, a principle the government has adopted in a variety of public 
services.   
 
However, the government argues that for the user-pays principle to apply, a service 
must be requested and delivered.120  In contrast, bargaining fees included in a union 
negotiated agreement are imposed upon an individual without the individual’s 
consent.  The fact that agreement applies to non-union employees does not mean 
the service is being provided for them because there is limited likelihood that the 
117 Orr, supra n 22, at 3. 
118 SENATE EMPLOYMENT, WORKPLACE RELATIONS, SMALL BUSINESS AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE, 
PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH, INQUIRY INTO THE THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS AMENDMENT 
(PROHIBITION OF COMPULSORY UNION FEES) BILL 2001 18 [1.28] (2001). 
119 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: GENERAL SURVEY OF THE REPORTS ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO 
ORGANISE CONVENTION (NO 87, 1948 AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
CONVENTION (NO 98), GENEVA (1994). 
120 SENATE EMPLOYMENT, WORKPLACE RELATIONS AND EDUCATION AND LEGISLATION COMMITTEE, 
PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT ON THE PROVISIONS OF BILLS TO AMEND THE 
WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996 23 [2.53] (2002). 
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union will consult with non-members, or address their specific needs.121  Further, 
the government contends that the union negotiates exclusively for its own members 
because it has a vested interest in applying the outcome of enterprise bargaining to 
non-members to ensure that wages and conditions upon which union members are 
employed are not undercut by other employees.      
 
However, under the freedom of association laws employees cannot be discriminated 
against on the basis union membership.  It therefore seems hypocritical for the 
government to outlaw the charging of bargaining fees for expenses incurred by a 
trade union in negotiating a collective agreement that must apply to all workers in 
an enterprise.122  Unions tend to negotiate for the workers as a collective, and the 
government's own statistics show that enterprise agreements negotiated by unions 
consistently produce higher Average Annualised Wage Increases for workers com-
pared to agreements negotiated without union involvement.123  Consequently, there 
are strong grounds for arguing that non-members, who receive all of the benefits of 
a certified agreement, should contribute something towards the cost of such an 
achievement.  A fee for bargaining services, if agreed to by the majority of employ-
ees, seems to be a fair way to implement a user-pays system and help alleviate the 
free-rider problem.   
 
C Enterprise Bargaining 
The amendments also run counter to the objects of the WR Act and the comments of 
the then Minister for Workplace Relations Mr Reith when he introduced the 
WROLA Bill.  Mr Reith in the Second Reading Speech stated that: 
 
The bill promotes a legislative framework, without unnecessary complex-
ity or unwanted third party intervention.  Above all, the legislation is de-
signed to empower employers and employees to make decisions about 
relationships at work, including over wages and conditions, based on their 
appreciation of their own interests.124
 
In each case where a collective agreement requires payment of a bargaining fee, this 
is subject to a vote of a valid majority of all employees whose employment will be 
subject to the agreement.  Despite this, the government does not accept that the 
121 SUBMISSION TO SENATE EMPLOYMENT, WORKPLACE RELATIONS AND EDUCATION AND LEGISLATION 
COMMITTEE, PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH, ‘DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND 
WORKPLACE RELATIONS, SUBMISSION NO 25’ REPORT ON THE PROVISIONS OF BILLS TO AMEND THE 
WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996 29 [27] (2002). 
122 REPORT ON THE PROVISIONS OF BILLS TO AMEND THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996, supra n 
113, at 40 [1.33]. 
123 Australian Government Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Trends in Federal 
Enterprise Bargaining (2004) Australian WorkPlace available at 
<http://www.workplace.gov.au/WP/Content/Files/WP/WR/Publications/Trends_J04.pdf> (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2004). 
124 SECOND READING SPEECH TO THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS AND OTHER LEGISLATION AMENDMENT 
BILL 1996, supra note 2. 
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process for employees to vote on certified agreements provides the necessary de-
gree of consent.  The focus of the freedom of association provisions of the WR Act 
is on the individual.  In view of this focus on individual freedom of choice, the 
government does not consider it appropriate that the operation of the freedom of 
association provisions be negated by a majority vote which results in the imposition 
of the will of the majority on individuals who are not, and do not wish to become, 
associated with a union.125  However, this overlooks the nature of the government’s 
enterprise bargaining regime which gives the power to the majority to dictate condi-
tions to the minority, provided those conditions are not discriminatory under the 
WR Act. 
 
Furthermore, the amendments overturn agreements made at the workplace by 
imposing unwanted third party intervention.  It denies the right of employers and 
employees to make decisions about their relationships at the workplace.  The gov-
ernment argues that the amendments merely clarify the operation of one aspect of 
the enterprise bargaining process.126  However, the WRAPCUF Act appears to be 
another attempt by the government to dictate the terms and conditions of enterprise 
bargaining through the imposition of limits on what employers and unions and/or 
employees can put on the bargaining table, in a supposedly deregulated work-
place.127  
 
The freedom of collective bargaining at enterprise level seems to demand that the 
law allow bargaining fee clauses to be included in certified agreements as agreed to 
between the negotiating parties.  Regulations limiting the level of the fee, allowing 
for non-member objections, and mandating a minimum level of support for bargain-
ing fee clauses, would seem to be fair trade-offs for their imposition, along with any 
other conditions that the parties see fit to agree to between themselves. 128   
 
D Overseas Examples 
Bargaining fees paid by employees covered by collective agreements who are not 
union members are provided for in a number of countries, including the United 
States, Canada, Switzerland, Israel and South Africa.129  Instead of outlawing 
bargaining fees, these countries have introduced controls to regulate their applica-
tion.   
 
The US courts have implemented a policy compromise that has promoted the ‘fair-
share’ version of bargaining fees designed to cover the bargaining activities of 
unions.   Further, Congress has not covered the field, with the exception of certain 
125 DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS, supra note 114, at 11 [47]. 
126 REPORT ON THE PROVISIONS OF BILLS TO AMEND THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996, supra note 
113, at 20 [2.47]. 
127 Pursuant to s 89A(2) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) the federal government had also 
previously reduced the number of matters with which an award can deal to 20 allowable matters. 
128 Orr, supra note 22, at 3. 
129 REPORT ON THE PROVISIONS OF BILLS TO AMEND THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS ACT 1996, supra note 
113, at 40 [1.34]. 
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key industries – it has given States the power to enact legislation to restrict union 
security arrangements.130  In addition, restrictions in other jurisdictions include a 
guarantee that bargaining fees only be spent in ways that benefit all employees at 
the workplace and that provision be made for conscientious objectors.131
 
Thus, there is significant international precedent for the implementation of bargain-
ing fees that has been largely ignored by the Australian government.  This is not to 
say that the playing fields are identical; there are significant differences between the 
Australian industrial relations system and those of international jurisdictions; how-
ever, these differences do not appear to render comparisons irrelevant.132   
 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Trade unions play an important role in representing the interests of the workforce in 
industrial relations, therefore, under the enterprise bargaining system, where unions 
require a high level of resources to service a large number of workplaces, it seems 
reasonable that those who reap the benefits of union representation should be re-
quired to pay a fee for their services.  In the absence of other, more potent, forms of 
union security, bargaining fees levied at a rate to reflect the bargaining services 
provided by a union offer an appropriate means of ensuring that this occurs.   
 
However, the High Court in ruling that bargaining fee clauses cannot be included in 
certified agreements seemed to give limited consideration to the role of unions in 
the industrial relations regime and their importance in the collective bargaining 
process.  Moreover, in largely ignoring the industrial realities of enterprise bargain-
ing and preferring to implement a legalistic interpretation of the WR Act, the High 
Court in Electrolux No 3 ensured that greater complexity in the negotiation of 
certified agreements will ensue.  The opposing view as expressed by Kirby J, pro-
vides a more liberal interpretation of the legislation which accommodates the prac-
ticalities of industrial relations. This broader line of argument ensures that no undue 
complication is brought into the negotiation of certified agreements and also en-
ables unions to better fulfil their role in representing the workforce by providing 
them with a much needed means of financial security. 
 
Unfortunately, the High Court’s decision in Electrolux No 3 combined with the 
government’s amendments to the WR Act has ensured that unions are prohibited 
from charging bargaining fees.  The government claimed to have prohibited the fees 
130 Orr, supra note 22, at 9. 
131 SUBMISSION TO SENATE COMMITTEE, PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AUSTRALIAN 
INDUSTRY GROUP AND THE ENGINEERING EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATION, SUBMISSION NO 25 SENATE 
EMPLOYMENT, WORKPLACE RELATIONS, SMALL BUSINESS AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO 
THE WORKPLACE RELATIONS AMENDMENT (PROHIBITION OF COMPULSORY UNION FEES) BILL 2001 
(2001) 
132 For instance, unions in Australia do not require majority membership in order to gain employer 
recognition for the purposes of collective bargaining as is the case in some other jurisdictions, however, 
all agreements negotiated by a union must be approved by a majority of employees. 
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on the basis that they offend the principle of freedom of association, and it is cer-
tainly arguable that bargaining fees levied at a rate above ordinary union dues have 
the potential to coerce employees into union membership.  However, the govern-
ment failed to consider other policy considerations and considerable international 
precedents that suggest if bargaining fees are limited to an amount covering bar-
gaining services alone, they provide unions with a beneficial source of financial 
security, whilst also overcoming the free-rider problem and maintaining respect for 
the concept of voluntary unionism.  Therefore, it is perhaps incorrect to suggest that 
the prohibition of bargaining fees was prescribed by the government on the basis of 
some overriding concern for the freedom of association.  Rather it seems more 
realistic to suggest that freedom of association was the guise under which the gov-
ernment was able to further marginalise the role of unions in industrial relations in 
order to promote its own ideological and economic agenda. 
  
 
